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Abstact: Religion can influence party politics in several ways: directly, through the activity of 
explicitly religious parties; indirectly, both through the lobbying activity of institutional actors 
such as churches and religious non-governmental organizations, and through the influence of 
religious values on the manifestos of non-explicitly religious parties. However, although 
several studies about specific contexts exist in the literature, an exhaustive comparative 
typological analysis of the role of religion in party politics is still missing. One of the main 
obstacles to a thorough classification is the notion of “religious party” itself, which many reject 
since it proves too restrictive and is often perceived as carrying a normative meaning. This 
article therefore proposes a typology of “religiously oriented parties”, which includes not only 
explicitly religious parties, but also formally secular parties that have significant sections of 
their manifestos dedicated to religious values, explicitly appeal to religious constituencies, 
and/or include significant religious factions. The article offers five types of religiously 
oriented parties: the conservative, the progressive, the fundamentalist, the religious 
nationalist, and the camp types. Each type is examined through several variables related to 
political parties more broadly: their organization, their relation with interest groups, their 






THE STATE OF THE ART: PARTY TYPOLOGIES 
In the literature on political parties we essentially find two kinds of typologies: one based on 
their organizational structure and the other focused on their genesis and social base. 
The first example of typology based on party structure is Weber's distinction between parties 
based on local organizations of notables and parties based on wide bureaucratic machines. 
While intermittent election-based activity and a loose structure on the ground characterize 
the former, the bureaucratic type involves a thick organization also active between 
elections.1 Later on, Maurice Duverger mirrored this dichotomy with the distinction between 
cadre parties and mass parties,2 differentiating also between direct and indirect parties with 
the latter “made up of the union of the component social groups (professional or 
otherwise)”.3 Later elaborations highlighted changes in the structure of the parties after 
World War II. Otto Kirchheimer proposed a well-known thesis about catch-all parties, 
characterized by the drastic erosion of their ideological baggage, the strengthening of the 
leadership to the detriment of supporters, the attempt to secure access to a wide range of 
interest groups, and the appeal to different social classes.4 Other models put forward were 
Angelo Panebianco's electoral-professional party, marked by the crucial role of 
specialists,5 Katz and Mair's cartel party, marked by the increasing role of public funding for 
parties,6 and the “stratarchical” model, marked out by different kinds of activities at different 
levels of organizational unit.7 
The second widespread approach to the study of parties is the genetic one based on Lipset 
and Rokkan's work on social cleavages. According to this perspective, the different parties 
active in twentieth-century West European political systems were the product of four social 
fractures which emerged as a consequence of state centralization and the industrial 
revolution: church and state, centre and periphery, land and industry, and capital and 
labour.8 Building on this perspective, von Beyme elaborated the idea of “spiritual families” of 
parties (including, among others, the Christian democratic one).9 Another update to the 
cleavages theory has been proposed by Inglehart in his work on the emergence of post-
materialist values. According to Inglehart, the fracture between materialist and post-
materialist perspectives represents a new cleavage, responsible for the emergence of new 
families of parties such as the Greens.10 
We can find mentions of religiously oriented parties more often in the less common typologies 
attempting to combine different criteria, mixing variables related to both the organization and 
the social base of parties: for example, Otto Kirchheimer's, which includes four party models: 
the bourgeois party of individual representation, the class-mass party, the denominational-
mass party, and the catch-all party.11 The concept of the denominational party has been 
further developed by Gunther and Diamond in their typology, which takes into account 
“several different dimensions of party life involving the varying electoral strategies, social 
representation, principal objectives, and organizational capacities of parties”. The work 
identifies 15 different “species” of party, each of which, in turn, belongs to a 
broader “genus” of party types: elite-based parties, mass-based parties, ethnicity-
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based parties, electoralist parties, and movement parties. Several of these genera 
are, in turn, separated into subcategories of “pluralistic” versus “proto-hegemonic” 
parties (separating loyal, democratic parties from semi-loyal or anti-system parties 
within democratic regimes), or into subcategories based on their level of 
commitment to an ideology or program.12 
Gunther and Diamond take into account religious parties, categorized as mass-based parties 
with commitment to religion rather than to a secular ideology. In the pluralistic version, they 
are defined as “denominational-mass parties” and in the proto-hegemonic as “religious 
fundamentalist parties”. According to Gunther and Diamond, this latter kind of party seeks “to 
reorganize state and society around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles”. 
Accordingly, there must be no separation between religion and the state, and religious norms 
must be imposed on all citizens, irrespectively of their private religious beliefs.13 The 
typology also includes “ethnicity-based parties”, which are devoted to “promote the interests 
of a particular ethnic group, or coalition of groups”.14 As we will see, this concept can be 
helpful in the classification of religious parties created to exclusively represent a specific 
religious or ethno-religious community, separated from the rest of society. 
Thus, both Kirchheimer's and Gunther and Diamond's works are notable exceptions in a 
comparative scholarship without many references to religiously oriented parties. The 
controversies connected to the concept of “religious party” (already accounted for in the 
introduction to this special issue) are largely to blame for preventing the development of a 
comparative literature on the subject. In addition, until the late twentieth century, the 
“secularization paradigm” hegemonized the social sciences, with religion thought of as a 
regressive factor, doomed either to disappear or to be relegated wholly to the private 
sphere.15 The scholarly dominance of the secularization thesis meant that religious parties 
were mostly dismissed as “opportunistic and not committed to electoral democracy […] 
intransigently ideological, uncompromisingly militant, extremist”, as well as authoritarian, 
sectarian, and anti-modern.16 
Although the claimed recent resurgence of religion17 has given rise to a wider and more 
articulated corpus of works on this topic,18 they are usually dedicated to the study of 
religious parties within a specific region and do not try to classify the phenomenon 
comprehensively. Among the most interesting subfields are the literature on Christian 
democratic parties in Europe19 and Latin America20 and on religious and religious-
nationalist parties in Israel21 and India.22 More recently, the literature on Islamist parties 
has also developed.23 In some rare cases we find attempts at comparing parties belonging to 
different traditions/regions.24 
At best, in such literature we can find classifications devoted to single regions/cases and/or 
taking into account both political parties and other phenomena such as social 
movements.25 Studies about the Muslim world, for example, often refer to a widely adopted 
distinction between radical and moderate Islamist parties, quite similar to the above-
mentioned dichotomy between denominational-mass parties and religious fundamentalist 
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parties proposed by Gunther and Diamond.26 In Jillian Schwedler's words, this distinction 
involves 
moderates, soft-liners, or reformers, on the one hand, and radicals, hard-liners, or 
stand-patters (those unwilling to undertake reforms) […]: moderates seek gradual 
reform within the existing system, while radicals seek revolutionary change often 
through the use of violence […]: moderates work within the constraints of the 
existing political institutions and practices, while radicals seek to overthrow the 
system entirely, perhaps (though not necessarily) through the use of violence.27 
We can also mention the distinction between “political”, “missionary”, and “jihadi” Sunni 
groups made by the International Crisis Group,28 the distinction between takfiri, local, or 
nationalist and moderate groups made by Tamara Cofman Wittes,29 and the distinction 
between reformist, fundamentalist militant, tactical modernist, and strategic modernist made 
by Daniel Brumberg.30In studies about Jewish parties in Israel we can often also find a 
distinction between ultra-orthodox (or haredi) parties with a separatist attitude and 
nationalist religious ones.31 
Since a comprehensive classification of religiously oriented parties cutting across different 
religions is still missing, the novelty of this contribution is the attempt to build such a 
typology, grounded in the more general literature on parties. In the next section, the article 
defines five basic types, showing how they differ from each other according to relevant 
criteria, such as their ideology, organization, relation with interest groups, and attitude 
towards democracy and pluralism. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
This special issue propounds the idea that the category “religious parties” is too narrow. It is 
also controversial, as there are only a few examples of parties that could unequivocally be 
identified as “religious”, and even they sometimes refuse to be labelled as such (sometimes 
out of strategic considerations to mark their independence from the religious institutions, as 
in the case of the Popular Party in early nineteenth-century Italy,32 and sometimes, as in 
Turkey, because of legal reasons due to the ban on explicitly religious parties33). This article 
tries instead to sketch a tentative typology of “religiously oriented parties”, defined as 
political parties focusing significant sections of their manifestos on “religious values”, 
explicitly appealing to religious constituencies, and/or including significant religious factions. 
This typology does not see itself as exhaustive or watertight, but only as a first attempt to 
categorize a phenomenon that plays a crucial role across radically different countries and 
cultures, setting off new dynamic interactions in very diverse political systems. Given the 
paucity of comprehensive contributions on the subject, an attempt to systematize such 
presence is certainly necessary and can form the starting point of future investigations. 
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In this typology, five types of religiously oriented parties are classified according to six 
criteria: their organizational model, their ideology (and particularly their attitude towards 
democratic pluralism), their relation with interest groups, their social base, their goals, and 
their influence on democratization processes. 
The typology conceptualizes ideal types, “formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or 
more points of view […] not to be found anywhere in reality”.34 In “real” politics, the parties 
do not exactly correspond to the ideal types identified in the typology, since they might share 
only some of the attributes of a particular type, and/or show features that cut across the 
attributes of different types. Therefore, this special issue mostly does not analyse empirical 
cases exactly corresponding to the ideal types, but rather tries to define them according to the 
typology while at the same time trying to understand “the extent to which this ideal-construct 
approximates or diverges from reality”.35 
The typology also aims at producing a classification “both exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive [italics in original]”,36 able “to minimize within-group variance, while maximizing 
between-group variance”.37 It tries to do so by synthesizing the mainstream literature on 
parties reviewed above with other traditions of analysis that might prove helpful although not 
specifically dedicated to political parties: particularly, the Fundamentalism Project, drawing 
crucial distinctions related to the ideology of the movements 
(“fundamentalist” versus “fundamentalist-like”, such as, nationalist) and their attitude towards 
the world (classifying “world conqueror”, “world transformer”, “world creator”, and “world 
renouncer” attitudes).38 Unlike existing classifications of religious parties, this article will 
also take into account cases such as the progressive and the camp type (according to Asher 
Cohen's39 definition these are parties devoted to the interests of a specific (ethno-)religious 
community rather than interested in putting forward a generalist ideology), mostly uncharted 
in the comparative literature, as well as cases of parties that are officially secular despite 
relying heavily on what might be understood as “religious values” to inform their stances and 
appeal to religious constituencies. 
As for the choice of the names used to define the single types, they have been carefully chosen 
in order to avoid risks of reification.40 Some are well-known categories already in use to 
define some families of parties. It is for instance the case of “conservative”, used here to define 
a party type focused on the defence of existing values and institutions, while taking at the 
same time a pragmatic stance and not characterized by a very detailed vision of the desired 
society.41 It is, as well, the case of “religious nationalist”, a term used in contexts such as India 
and Israel. The term “fundamentalist”, as in Gunther and Diamond's classification,42 is 
applied here to define those parties with a primary focus on what they assert are “religious 
values” and a conflictual attitude towards the existing (secular) political system. Other names 
are less used in the literature. This is the case with the term “progressive”, used here in 
accordance with the definition of progressivism as an ideology supporting state intervention 
in defence of social and civil rights.43 As for the “camp” type, it takes its name from the Israeli 
case, and specifically from Asher Cohen's definition of “camp party” as a party concerned 
about the representation of a specific community, rather than about specific kinds of 
6 
 
policies.44 It is also inspired by the literature on ethnic parties45 to which this party type 
partially resembles (Table 1). 
 




TYPES OF RELIGIOUSLY ORIENTED PARTIES 
Type 1: conservative 
This type includes denominational mass parties that have evolved to show at least some 
features of (interdenominational) catch-all parties “appealing to all voters except convinced 
anti-clericals”,46 such as Christian democratic parties (for example, Italy's Christian 
Democracy, Spain's Popular Party, Germany's Christian Democratic Union,47 Turkey's Justice 
and Development Party – AKP48 – and Tunisia's Ennahda 49). It also includes conservative 
catch-all parties with strong religious factions able to influence their policy agendas as in the 
case of the USA's Republican Party.50 In particular, they engage with different kinds of 
interest groups,51 although usually preserving strong relations of cooperation with some 
religious institution and – especially in Europe – integration with religiously oriented 
organizations such as trade unions.52 For their activities, having developed autonomous 
networks of political activists, they no longer depend on religious institutions and their 
organizational networks (although these latter often support the party and play a significant 
role in campaigns).53 
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Their ideology is based – usually explicitly or at times, as in Turkey, through cultural 
references – on the preservation of core religious values and “the passionate affirmation of 
the value of existing institutions”.54 However, only part of their policies is inspired by 
religious values; they accept secular democratic institutions as well as social and political 
pluralism. Although they try to widen the role of religion in the public sphere, they do not aim 
at making it the only basis for state law and institutions.55Coherently with the general catch-
all model, they are usually non-ideological and are quite flexible, unless they perceive 
existential threats against basic values and institutions. This pragmatic attitude is also a 
consequence of their attempt to maximize their votes in pluralistic and often officially secular 
societies, which renders necessary a cooperative strategy – on display at both the intra-party 
and the inter-party levels – of alliance with different groups, religious and non-religious alike. 
This cooperative attitude is shown also at the international level with agendas promoting 
cooperation and at times supranational integration.56 In the economic field, although 
implementing charity activities and putting forward religiously inspired calls to social justice, 
they usually take pragmatic stances, often proposing free-trade economic policies that 
promote middle-class interests and often establish good relations with big capitalism.57 In 
multi-party systems, they are usually open to alliances with a host of political forces of 
different ideological persuasions, as in the case of the Italian Christian Democracy58 or the 
Islamist party Ennahda in Tunisia.59 
Because of the need to create broad alliances, the composition of the conservative party type 
is usually quite mixed, with different ideological strands and factions,60 ranging from the 
nationalist right to moderate progressive factions, with a prevalence, however, of the socially 
conservative right. What holds them together is a vision of society where religious values are 
given a prominent role, although not a dominant and imposing one. Their mixed internal 
composition sometimes results in a fierce struggle – increased by the fact that the party is not 
totally in control of its core religious message61 – as in the case of the US Republican Party, 
but this can be tamed sometimes where charismatic rule prevails, as in Turkey's AKP.62 Their 
constituency is also quite mixed, but usually includes large segments of the middle class, 
professionals as well as entrepreneurs. These parties are stronger in small towns and rural 
areas rather than in big cities, although in poorer countries they may do well in impoverished 
slums surrounding urban areas.63 The appeal of these parties among the poorer segments of 
the population – especially in societies traumatized by secularly oriented globalization 
processes – is sometimes also the consequence of an ethical stance marking this party type 
out when compared to other movements perceived to be more corrupt.64 There is no doubt 
for instance that Islamist parties across the Muslim world thrive in part because of their anti-
corruption message, as the case of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development 
highlights.65 
Their overall impact on the quality of democracy66 and on democratization processes is 
usually quite positive because they often promote the political socialization of rural and 
traditional masses previously not involved in politics and attempt to create social harmony, 
producing public policies that balance out different economic interests. The main shortcoming 
of this type of party when it comes to the issue of democracy and democratization is the 
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tendency, in multi-party systems, to occupy the centre.67 As it is shown by cases such as 
Italy's Christian Democracy, Turkey's AKP and the Ulster Unionist Party in Northern Ireland, 
this situation can prevent changes of government, with the possible consequence of 
stagnation (and sometimes corruption) as a consequence of long periods of uninterrupted 
power.68 
 
Type 2: progressive 
This is the least common type of religiously oriented party since religious engagement in 
politics is more often associated to (centre-)right-wing ideologies and conservative values, 
while progressive politics is usually the monopoly of secular liberal and leftist forces that 
traditionally consider religion one of the main obstacles to the success of their vision of 
society. Thus, in many contexts this party model is absent – for example, in most of the 
Muslim world, in which non-leftist Islamic parties have a network of welfare provision 
entities themselves69 – and, even in contexts where such parties are created, they are usually 
small, resembling the cadre party model rather than the mass and catch-all ones.70 Indeed, 
religious progressive forces often rely on interest groups such as Catholic trade unions and 
associations in Europe and progressive churches in the US rather than on an organization of 
their own.71 Another reason why such parties are quite rare is that for those religious 
activists who have rather conservative moral values and at the same time are socially 
progressive when it comes to the redistribution of wealth, it is easier to be active in civil 
society movements without creating a specific party – as in the cases of some left-wing 
religious groups in Italy – or to be included in a wider umbrella party where their views are 
tempered in a wider environment.72 This latter option can result in a variety of choices 
ranging from engagement in wide (centre) left-wing parties (the Democratic party in Italy and 
the US), in centre parties (Christian democracy in Italy and Germany) and even in the 
nationalist right (the Nationalist Religious Party in Israel).73 
The ideological construct of these parties subordinates the desire to widen the role of religion 
in the public sphere – which plays a secondary role in their ideology and in the public policies 
they pursue – to a strong orientation for social justice, civil rights, and peace, framed in a 
pluralistic worldview. This drive towards social justice with religious undertones can be the 
result of the influence of some version of socialist thought – some strands of Latin American 
liberation theology, such as Nicaragua's, come to mind,74 as well as the experiences of 
“Buddhist socialism” in South-East Asia75 and Israel's Meimad party76 – but can also derive 
from the emphasis on the more socially oriented planks of the scriptures,77 as in the case of 
some progressive factions within Italy's Christian democratic movement.78 Accompanying 
these progressive social views are sometimes interventions on moral issues where the main 
argument is that they should be left to the individuals in so far as there is space for dissenting 
voices and behaviour. This should not be condoned, but targeted instead through education in 
order to realign to a religiously ethical order. However, this dual nature makes such 
movements highly unstable with strong tensions between the religious and the social planks 
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of their ideology and policy choices. They usually do not have a particularly wide voters' basin 
and find their main constituency among educated and urban middle-class people.79 
They usually make alliances with secular progressive parties, as in the cases of Israel's 
Meimad's alliance with the Labour Party and of Italy's Margherita's alliance with the 
Democrats of the left. In some specific regional cases, in which a larger number of religious 
people support a progressive social agenda, there have also been attempts, mostly resulting in 
failure, to build intra-party coalitions with other forces under the umbrella of a socially 
progressive ideology.80 In any case, followers of religious progressive ideologies are often not 
well accepted in secular leftist circles where their religious ideology is not particularly 
welcome, or in the conservative and nationalist religious right circles, which largely reject 
their progressive orientation on socio-economic issues. This contradiction can also result in 
fierce internal and external ideological conflicts and schisms.81 
Their impact on the quality of democracy and democratization processes is potentially 
positive, both because their emphasis on peace and dialogue can enhance social as well as 
international harmony, and because their mixed social-religious identity can contribute to 
bridge the gap between secular socialist and religious forces. This influence is, however, 
usually not crucial, since these parties rarely appeal to a large electorate and have limited 
social support. A significant drawback, evident in cases such as Northern Ireland and Israel, is 
that their ideology might include nationalist strands, which can hinder their role as dialogue-
promoters.82 
 
Type 3: religious nationalist 
These parties subordinate religious orientation to strong nationalist83 sentiments and they 
are usually the product of social structures where ethno-religious divides are particularly 
significant, such as India, Israel/Palestine, and Sri Lanka. They usually are organized as mass 
parties, although their size in the different contexts varies. Since they thrive in the militant 
struggle against opposite communities and movements, the peculiar unity at the foundation of 
their organization is the militia (usually, as explained by Duverger,84 accompanied by 
sections and/or other organizational elements). In the case of India's Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), there are real, formally structured, paramilitary units,85 while in other cases, such as 
Israel's nationalist religious parties, the militias are informal, as the parties are based on the 
armed colonists' community.86 At times such militias are only symbolic, as in the case of 
Italy's Northern League's “green shirts”.87 Thus, militias are associated to a mass structure 
and sometimes, as in cases of big parties such as India's BJP, to some features of the catch-all 
party at the strategic electoral level, as Jaffrelot's contribution to the special issue 
highlights.88 They can be directly connected to religiously oriented social movements, which 
can sometimes dominate the party, preventing its moderation attempts from succeeding. At 
times, as the case of Israel's Kach illustrates, they can also have charismatic religious leaders. 
This is especially common in cases that border the fundamentalist model, which will be 
discussed later. The charismatic factor is an important part of the story of religious nationalist 
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parties and it is usually much stronger than in the other party types except perhaps the 
fundamentalist one.89 
As for ideology, the main motives behind their creation and activism are usually connected to 
the struggle to control the physical space and public institutions against other (ethno-
)religious communities. Where the state institutions are largely secular, as for example in 
Israel, these parties can also be involved in a parallel struggle against them – at least when 
they are controlled by forces not friendly towards the nationalist creed – to widen the role of 
religion in the public sphere.90 Their discourse displays strong religious overtones with a 
sacralization of the motherland. In this perspective, the rival communities are perceived as an 
alien presence, whose “otherness” from the “local” culture is emphasized.91 Holy places 
obviously enjoy a privileged role as foci of major contention and deserve special 
emphasis.92 When it comes to public institutions these parties often promote controversial 
debates about the real foundations of the legal system and state secularism, as well as about 
specific issues, such as the separate civil code for Muslims in India.93 They can support both 
free-trade and protectionist economic policies, since the economy is not usually among their 
main concerns, and in foreign policy they can take aggressive stances against states whose 
religious majority is perceived as an enemy. This would be the case of the BJP's attitude to 
Pakistan, of Israel's Jewish nationalists towards Arab states,94 and of the Democratic Unionist 
Party to the Irish state. At times religious nationalist parties can decide to reach different 
social constituencies, but the bulk of activists and supporters usually include deprived social 
classes, as well as middle-class people that have lost or are afraid to lose their status or feel 
threatened by immigration.95 
In political systems, they are aligned on the conservative right (and not rarely the extreme 
right) of the spectrum and they are usually open to alliances with other nationalist forces, and 
sometimes with conservative ones, as in some Israeli cabinets. In some cases they can decide 
to merge with similar parties, as for example in Israel with the creation of the National Union 
in the late 1990s and the Jewish Home in the 2000s. These umbrella parties are however often 
short-lived, and prone to factionalism.96A partial exception to such generalizations is 
represented, again, by big parties, such as Israel's Likud and India's BJP, that have at times 
accepted to make alliances and/or form governments with different kinds of parties in order 
to seize and keep power.97 
Their overall impact on democracy and democratization is usually not positive for two 
reasons. First, they tend to display at times an ideology questioning some tenets of democratic 
values, especially in terms of pluralism, given the extremely competitive environment within 
which they are created due to the presence of different religious groups on the same territory 
or with claims on it. Privileging one's own religion and belonging over the rights of others is 
hardly conducive to compromise. Second, in democratizing contexts, their political activism 
usually results in an increase in social and political conflicts among ethno-religious 




Type 4: fundamentalist 
The fundamentalist party type is a mass party wishing to reorganize state and society around 
a specific interpretation of a religious message, turning religious law – or at least some 
religious ideology derived from a particular interpretation of it – into state law. As Gunther 
and Diamond explain: 
[g]iven the far-reaching objectives of these parties (which may verge on the 
totalitarian), the organizational development of these parties and the scope of their 
activities are extensive. Member involvement and identification is substantial and 
even intense, and ancillary organizations establish a presence at the local level 
throughout society. […] authority relations within the party are hierarchical, 
undemocratic and even absolutist, and members are disciplined and devoted. 
Religious fundamentalist parties mobilize support not only by invoking religious 
doctrine and identity, and by proposing policies derived from those principles, but 
also through selective incentives; they often perform a wide range of social welfare 
functions which aid in recruiting and solidifying the loyalty of members. This web 
of organized activities and services encapsulates members within a distinct 
subculture.99 
The parties in this category can also be connected to religious organizations with a broader 
appeal in society. Also, as a consequence of their welfare activities, they usually find their 
militants among frustrated and deprived people from middle–lower classes – usually living in 
rural areas and urban shantytowns – but sometimes also among highly ideologized middle-
class people. As a whole, their existence is closely connected to the life and engagement of the 
charismatic leader: its loss usually results in schisms and internal disarray.100 
Unlike conservative parties, fundamentalist parties wish not simply to widen the role of 
religion in the public sphere. According to Neumann's classification, they are parties of “total 
integration” with “ambitious goals of seizing power and radically transforming societies, 
demanding the full commitment and unquestioning obedience of members”.101 As a 
consequence, they have a strong anti-systemic orientation, and their commitment to 
democracy is at best questionable.102 This means that they might accept the pure mechanical 
procedures of democracy, but believe in very serious constraints in terms of liberal rights. 
Thus, it can be argued that they regard democracy as a means to conquer power (or at least 
get some public recognition for their issues), not as an end. In Brumberg's words, even when 
they choose to participate in the democratic institutions, they apply a strategy of “tactical 
modernism”.103 It is this contradictory stance towards democracy that makes them anti-
systemic since were they to be voted into power, they might subvert democratic institutions 
and safeguards in the name of religious precepts.104 
Sometimes they exist only underground, finding it very difficult to be licensed to operate 
because they often have connections to violent groups. When they institutionalize, these 
parties are often closed down or banned, as the cases of the Welfare Party in 
Turkey105 and Ennahda in Tunisia106 demonstrate. They rarely choose to ally with other 
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forces for a number of reasons, but primarily because they can rarely compromise and often 
display extreme versions of charismatic leadership. Both traits make them prefer to act 
alone.107 
The parties in this category can sometimes border with the nationalist religious type, as, 
again, in the case of Kach,108 but might also undertake a trajectory of moderation, turning 
into a conservative party or creating a new one from the ashes of old experiences, as 
happened with the creation of the AKP in Turkey.109 Indeed, the effect of a long-term 
democratic participation of fundamentalist parties is a hotly debated issue within the so-
called inclusion-moderation literature.110 
 
Type 5: camp 
As already mentioned, the term “camp parties” derives from Asher Cohen's111 work on Israel 
and identifies parties devoted to the interests of a specific religious community (which may 
coincide with a specific ethnic group, or may not) rather than interested in putting forward a 
generalist ideology. They are “typified by the fact that a particularly large majority of those 
affiliated with the ‘camp’ vote for that camp's party”, and “by the lack of political competition 
over its adherents via the establishment of significant political alternatives”.112 As a 
consequence of this role, they are likely to get most of the votes within that community, 
irrespective of social class, gender, and other divides. The specificity of this party type, also in 
accordance with Gunther and Diamond's “ethnicity-based party”113 is that it finds its 
main raison d’être in preserving the identity of and the separation from the rest of the society 
of the group it represents: a separation that can be virtual or even, as in the case of 
the haredi groups in Israel, physical. The crucial difference of this type and the nationalist and 
fundamentalist ones is indeed the separatist attitude of the party, aiming at granting and 
preserving some privileges of an (ethno-)religious group in a pluralistic environment, rather 
than engaging in conflict against other communities and/or the political institutions. We see 
some evidence in Northern Ireland in the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Féin's 
support for maintaining segregated education.114 
This does not mean that such parties cannot evolve. For example, the haredi parties in Israel 
and the Tamil parties in Sri Lanka mostly moved towards the nationalist model, while in other 
cases – such as Lebanon's Hezbollah – the parties oscillate between different types.115 At 
times their group of reference can also change, as, again, in the Israeli case for the Sephardi 
Orthodox party Shas, which split in the 1980s from the previously interethnic orthodox party 
Agudat Israel.116 Their organizations and agendas are also very similar to the ones of ethnic 
parties, as the separatist religious communities they represent mostly act the same way as 
ethnic communities (even when they do not represent a specific ethnic group): “descent-
based attributes”117 are crucial determinants of people's belonging to the group. As already 
mentioned, they virtually find their sole constituency within the group they represent and 
“unlike other types of political parties, electoral mobilization is not intended to attract 
additional voters outside the group”.118 Their organization, more similar to the cadre than to 
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the mass model, heavily relies on the structures of the non-associational interest groups they 
represent and their social institutions, as well as on ad hoc organizations created by the party 
itself. Again, Shas' example, with its massive networks of charitable and welfare-oriented 
organizations, is relevant.119 
Their political stances are usually not particularly codified and can be reoriented according to 
the specific needs of the time, giving them a rather pragmatic attitude on many issues because 
ultimately they are focused on the defence of a specific community's interests, and need to 
appeal to a constituency belonging to different social classes or age cohorts. The same 
pragmatism emerges when it comes to their strategy of alliances, which can lead to 
cooperation with different movements, as long as they accept to grant some concessions to 
their community. In Israel, Shas has been involved in both left-wing and right-wing 
governments and in India both the Sikh party Shiromani Akali Dal and the Muslim party 
Jammu & Kashmir National Conference have been part of governments led by the Hindu 
religious nationalist BJP.120 They often perform significant welfare activities in the 
community they represent, also creating and sustaining separate schools, media, and a host of 
economic activities, which can boost employment within the community.121 As mentioned, 
they can evolve as social divides also change, as in Israel, where a purely religious divide has 
turned into an ethno-religious divide. 
Since such parties are ready to support different kinds of governments and mainstream 
policies, their influence on democracy cannot easily be evaluated. On the one hand, their 
emphasis on a specific identity can result in a lack of political socialization and in a deficit of 
integration within the wider social system, making it more difficult for their constituency to 
fully accept democracy.122 Especially in contexts marked by the presence of different enclave 
communities such as India and Israel, this situation can favour the rise of opposed 
nationalisms and, consequently, implicitly contribute to hinder social harmony. On the other 
hand, some scholars contend that such parties can also have a positive influence on 
democratic stability, particularly in recently democratized regimes “if they are institutionally 




CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The party types outlined in this article are ideal types, which are not necessarily to be found in 
the real world and not in every context. In many cases we find real parties which fit quite well 
in the types proposed, while in other cases the correspondence is more blurred, with some 
features missing or overlapping. At times, we can even find “hybrid” cases that are difficult to 
categorize. It is the case, for example, of India's BJP, which at least in some phases of its 
history (and at least at the strategic electoral level) has shown features of a catch-all 
conservative party with a secular orientation. It is also the case of some progressive parties 
14 
 
active in countries with high levels of sectarian conflict, such as Israel and Northern Ireland, 
mixing a socially oriented attitude – often with socialist undertones – with strong nationalist 
feelings associated with a specific religious creed. Some Israeli parties also combine a 
nationalist religious identity with a fundamentalist one, in a way that makes it difficult to 
single out the predominant one. In other cases, as in Turkey, at the official level religiously 
oriented parties have often wilfully obscured their confessional identity for legal reasons. In 
addition, it should be highlighted that a number of large parties such as the Republican Party 
in the US, some Christian democratic parties in Europe and Latin America, India's BJP, 
Tunisia's Ennahdaand Turkey's AKP are complex entities, often including several different 
factions, from the social left to the nationalist right, which can have the upper hand at 
different times, thus changing the orientation of a party. 
This leads us to another controversial feature of religiously oriented parties: the possibility of 
change, moving from one type to another, or even from a religiously oriented to a secular 
identity and the reverse, as in the cases of the US Republican Party, Italy's Northern League, 
and Israel's Likud and Beiteinu Israel, which were once secular parties that in time have 
accentuated their religious orientation rather instrumentally to catch new voters, or through 
internal changes that brought a different (more religiously oriented) leadership to the fore. In 
this article, as well as in the whole of this special issue, we see indeed that parties can switch 
type, sometimes from the fundamentalist to the conservative model, some others from the 
“camp” towards the nationalist one. In other cases, for example that of India's BJP, the 
transition is purely tactical or, at least, made more difficult by the influence of a strong 
religious movement hovering over the party. Finally, at times there is even a trajectory of 
radicalization from the conservative to the fundamentalist model. 
A general theory accounting for the role of religion in party change is, however, still missing 
and the hope here is that the typology of religiously oriented parties proposed might 
stimulate other scholars to try to improve and complete it, and to elaborate a wider theory 
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